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Economic performance does not necessarily improve when under-performing governments are ejected by the voters

Marinova, Dani (2014) Economic performance does not necessarily improve when under-performing governments are ejected by the voters. Democratic Audit Blog (24 Oct 2014). Website.

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Abstract

Elections are the “instruments of democracy” so long as voters hold incumbents accountable for their performance in office. Periodic elections in which the process of accountability works well should generate electoral incentives for politicians to pursue good economic policy during their term in office. Dani Marinova uncovers little systematic support for this logic. Unemployment was no lower when voters correctly perceive and assign blame for the state of the economy than in elections where voters misattribute economic performance.

Item Type: Online resource (Website)
Official URL: http://www.democraticaudit.com/
Additional Information: © 2014 Democratic Audit UK.; Online
Divisions: LSE
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) > JN101 Great Britain
Sets: Collections > Democratic Audit Blog
Date Deposited: 18 Aug 2015 09:38
Last Modified: 02 Aug 2020 23:17
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/63221

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