The reputational basis of public accountability

Busuioc, Madalina and Lodge, Martin (2016) The reputational basis of public accountability. Governance, 29 (2). pp. 247-263. ISSN 0952-1895

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Abstract

This paper proposes a reputation-based approach to account for two core puzzles of accountability. The first is the misfit between behavioural predictions of the hegemonic political science framework for talking about accountability, namely principal-agent, and empirical findings. The second puzzle is the unrivalled popularity of accountability, given evidence that supposedly accountability-enhancing measures often lead to opposite effects. A ‘reputation-informed’ theoretical approach to public accountability suggests that accountability is not about reducing informational asymmetries, containing ‘drift’, or ensuring that agents stay committed to the terms of their mandate. Accountability – in terms of both holding and giving – is about managing and cultivating one’s reputation vis-à-vis different audiences. It is about being seen as a reputable actor in the eyes of one’s audience(s), conveying the impression of competently performing one’s (accountability) roles, thereby generating reputational benefits.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(IS...
Additional Information:	© 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Library of Congress subject classification:	J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Sets:	Departments > Government Research centres and groups > Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (CARR)
Date Deposited:	26 Jun 2015 10:58
URL:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62494/

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