Trubowitz, Peter 
ORCID: 0000-0003-2200-091X and Harris, Peter
(2015)
When states appease: British appeasement in the 1930s.
Review of International Studies, 41 (02).
pp. 289-311.
ISSN 0260-2105
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Abstract
When do states appease their foes? In this article, we argue that governments are most likely to favour appeasing a foreign threat when their top leaders are severely cross–pressured: when the demands for increased security conflict sharply with their domestic political priorities. We develop the deductive argument through a detailed analysis of British appeasement in the 1930s. We show that Neville Chamberlain grappled with a classic dilemma of statecraft: how to reduce the risk of German expansionism while facing acute partisan and electoral incentives to invest resources at home. For Chamberlain, appeasement was a means to reconcile the demands for increased security with what he and his co-partisans were trying to achieve domestically. We conclude by discussing implications of the analysis for theorising about appeasement and about how leaders make grand strategy more generally.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJourna... |
| Additional Information: | ©2014 British International Studies Association |
| Divisions: | International Relations IGA: LSE IDEAS |
| Subjects: | D History General and Old World > DA Great Britain J Political Science > JZ International relations |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Apr 2015 11:09 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2024 03:42 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/61659 |
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