Counterfactual desirability

Bradley, Richard and Stefansson, H. Orii (2015) Counterfactual desirability. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science . pp. 1-49. ISSN 1464-3537

PDF - Accepted Version Restricted to Repository staff only until 5 August 2017. Download (593Kb)

• LSE expert's profile

• Published item via DOI

Abstract

The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes generate a class of problems for orthodox decision theory, the best-known perhaps being the so-called Allais paradox. In this article we solve these problems by extending Richard Jeffrey’s decision theory to counterfactual prospects, using a multidimensional possible-world semantics for conditionals, and showing that preferences that are sensitive to counterfactual considerations can still be desirability-maximizing. We end the article by investigating the conditions necessary and sufficient for a desirability function to be a standard expected-utility function. It turns out that the additional conditions imply highly implausible epistemic principles.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/
Additional Information:	© 2015 The Authors
Library of Congress subject classification:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Sets:	Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Projects:	AH/J006033/1 to R.B., AH/I003118/1, 14-AXA-PDOC-222
Funders:	Arts and Humanities Research Council , AXA Research Fund
Date Deposited:	18 Feb 2015 13:44
URL:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60981/

Actions (login required)

Record administration - authorised staff only