Counterfactual desirability

Bradley, Richard ORCID: 0000-0003-2184-7844 and Stefansson, H. Orii (2017) Counterfactual desirability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68 (2). 485 - 533. ISSN 0007-0882

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Abstract

The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes generate a class of problems for orthodox decision theory, the best-known perhaps being the so-called Allais paradox. In this article we solve these problems by extending Richard Jeffrey’s decision theory to counterfactual prospects, using a multidimensional possible-world semantics for conditionals, and showing that preferences that are sensitive to counterfactual considerations can still be desirability-maximizing. We end the article by investigating the conditions necessary and sufficient for a desirability function to be a standard expected-utility function. It turns out that the additional conditions imply highly implausible epistemic principles.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/
Additional Information:	© 2015 The Authors
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Date Deposited:	18 Feb 2015 13:44
Last Modified:	12 Dec 2024 01:20
Projects:	AH/J006033/1 to R.B., AH/I003118/1, 14-AXA-PDOC-222
Funders:	Arts and Humanities Research Council, AXA Research Fund
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/60981

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