Bradley, Richard ORCID: 0000-0003-2184-7844 and Stefansson, H. Orii
(2017)
Counterfactual desirability.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68 (2).
485 - 533.
ISSN 0007-0882
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Abstract
The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes generate a class of problems for orthodox decision theory, the best-known perhaps being the so-called Allais paradox. In this article we solve these problems by extending Richard Jeffrey’s decision theory to counterfactual prospects, using a multidimensional possible-world semantics for conditionals, and showing that preferences that are sensitive to counterfactual considerations can still be desirability-maximizing. We end the article by investigating the conditions necessary and sufficient for a desirability function to be a standard expected-utility function. It turns out that the additional conditions imply highly implausible epistemic principles.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/ |
Additional Information: | © 2015 The Authors |
Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) |
Date Deposited: | 18 Feb 2015 13:44 |
Last Modified: | 01 Aug 2024 06:18 |
Projects: | AH/J006033/1 to R.B., AH/I003118/1, 14-AXA-PDOC-222 |
Funders: | Arts and Humanities Research Council, AXA Research Fund |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/60981 |
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