Dewan, Torun, Galeotti, Andrea, Ghiglino, Christian and Squintani, Francesco (2015) Information aggregation and optimal structure of the executive. American Journal of Political Science, 59 (2). 475 - 494. ISSN 0092-5853
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Abstract
We model two aspects of executives in parliamentary democracies: Decision-making authority is assigned to individuals, and private information is aggregated through communication. When information is relevant to all policies and communication is private, all decisions should be centralized to a single politician. A government that holds cabinet meetings, where information is made available to all decision makers, outperforms one where communication is private: A multimember cabinet can be optimal; it need not be single peaked around the most moderate politician or ideologically connected. Centralization is nonmonotonic in the degree of ideological divergence. In a large cabinet, all power should be given to the most moderate politician. Even when uncertainty is policy specific and a single politician is informed on each policy, power should never be fully decentralized. Our model provides a justification for centralized authority and cabinet meetings that enhance the quality of policy.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Official URL: | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/15405907 |
| Additional Information: | © 2014 Midwest Political Science Association |
| Divisions: | Government |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HE Transportation and Communications J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Oct 2014 10:37 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Nov 2024 20:09 |
| Projects: | ERC-starting grant (award no. 283454) |
| Funders: | European Research Council, The Leverhulme Trust, Philip Leverhulme Prize |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/59632 |
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