Bradley, Seamus and Steele, Katie Siobhan (2014) Should subjective probabilities be sharp? Episteme, 11 (03). pp. 277-289. ISSN 1742-3600
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga (2010), that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. We argue that these assumptions are too strong and that rational imprecise choice is possible in the absence of these overly strong conditions.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://journals.cambridge.org/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2014 Cambridge University Press. |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Aug 2014 13:35 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Nov 2024 19:51 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/59174 |
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