Spinnewijn, Johannes ORCID: 0000-0002-7963-5847 (2015) Unemployed but optimistic: optimal insurance design with biased beliefs. Journal of the European Economic Association, 13 (1). pp. 130-167. ISSN 1542-4766
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Abstract
This paper analyzes how biased beliefs about employment prospects affect the optimal design of unemployment insurance. Empirically, I find that the unemployed greatly overestimate how quickly they will find work. As a consequence, they would search too little for work, save too little for unemployment and deplete their savings too rapidly when unemployed. I analyze the use of the "sufficient-statistics" formula to characterize the optimal unemployment policy when beliefs are biased and revisit the desirability of providing liquidity to the unemployed. I also find that the optimal unemployment policy may involve increasing benefits during the unemployment spell.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(IS... |
Additional Information: | © 2014 European Economic Association |
Divisions: | Economics |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions |
JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents > H30 - General |
Date Deposited: | 28 Aug 2014 13:34 |
Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2024 03:04 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/59165 |
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