Johnson, Gbemende
(2014)
State supreme courts are more likely to defer to executive branch agencies in states with institutionally powerful Governors.
LSE American Politics and Policy
(16 Jun 2014).
Website.
Abstract
State executive branch agencies can find their rules and regulations challenged in court, often leading to a state’s Supreme Court having to rule on whether or not to uphold them. But can the decisions of a state’s Supreme Court be influenced by a powerful Governor, who may try and resist either directly through reappointments, or indirectly through regulation? Using survey data from more than 2,200 state Supreme Court cases, Gbemende Johnson finds that Supreme Courts are more likely to rule in favor of executive branch agencies in states where the governor has increased institutional control over the entire executive branch structure. However, she also finds that Governors are unlikely to retaliate directly by changing judicial appointments, as they are likely to want to avoid very public institutional conflicts.
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