Hall, Melinda Gann (2014) State supreme court justices are more likely to reverse death penalty sentences when they are term limited. LSE American Politics and Policy (17 Jun 2014). Website.
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Abstract
In theory, state supreme court justices should be independent in their decision making, rather than representative of voters’ interests as is the case for legislators. But can state supreme court justices’ decisions on certain major issues, such as the death penalty, be influenced by whether or not they are concerned about reelection? Using data from more than 8,000 death penalty cases in the late 1990s, Melinda Gann Hall finds that electorally insecure justices are more likely to make popular decisions on the issue of the death penalty when reelection is a concern, but in their final terms these justices are more likely to cast unpopular votes even under the most threatening circumstances.
Item Type: | Online resource (Website) |
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Official URL: | http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/ |
Additional Information: | © 2014 The Author |
Divisions: | LSE |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
Date Deposited: | 13 Aug 2014 11:48 |
Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 13:44 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/58954 |
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