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The ability to propose legislation leads to an increased vote share for politicians in subsequent elections

Loewen, Peter and Koop, Royce (2014) The ability to propose legislation leads to an increased vote share for politicians in subsequent elections. LSE American Politics and Policy (17 Mar 2014). Blog Entry.

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Abstract

It is generally accepted that constituents punish and reward their elected representatives at the ballot box for their legislative actions. But there is surprisingly little research on the link between politicians’ legislative activities and their chances of re-election. Using evidence from Canada, and by controlling for other influences on election vote shares, Peter Loewen and Royce Koop find that those MPs that are able to introduce legislation via private members (the ‘power to propose’) bills do reap a small reward in their subsequent elections.

Item Type: Online resource (Blog Entry)
Official URL: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/
Additional Information: © 2014 The Authors; Online
Divisions: LSE
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
J Political Science > J General legislative and executive papers
Sets: Collections > LSE American Politics and Policy (USAPP) Blog
Date Deposited: 08 Aug 2014 13:30
Last Modified: 25 Apr 2019 23:14
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/58798

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