Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

More complex congressional oversight over government agencies means reduced influence relative to that of the White House

Clinton, Joshua (2013) More complex congressional oversight over government agencies means reduced influence relative to that of the White House. LSE American Politics and Policy (14 Nov 2013). Blog Entry.

[img]
Preview
PDF - Published Version
Download (232kB) | Preview

Abstract

The oversight and review of government agencies is an important part of Congress’ function. But can this oversight become so complex that it actually reduces the influence of Congress over policymaking in the federal bureaucracy? Using a survey of more than 2,000 government executives, Joshua Clinton finds that the more Congressional committees that are involved in agency oversight, the more empowered the president is compared to Congress. He writes that this may stem from a tendency for some committees to ‘free-ride’ off of the efforts of others, and divisions across committees over what they wish the agency to do.

Item Type: Online resource (Blog Entry)
Official URL: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/
Additional Information: © 2013 The Author; Online
Divisions: LSE
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
J Political Science > JZ International relations
Sets: Collections > LSE American Politics and Policy (USAPP) Blog
Date Deposited: 28 Jul 2014 13:07
Last Modified: 27 Aug 2019 23:19
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/58353

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics