Clinton, Joshua (2013) More complex congressional oversight over government agencies means reduced influence relative to that of the White House. LSE American Politics and Policy (14 Nov 2013). Website.
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Abstract
The oversight and review of government agencies is an important part of Congress’ function. But can this oversight become so complex that it actually reduces the influence of Congress over policymaking in the federal bureaucracy? Using a survey of more than 2,000 government executives, Joshua Clinton finds that the more Congressional committees that are involved in agency oversight, the more empowered the president is compared to Congress. He writes that this may stem from a tendency for some committees to ‘free-ride’ off of the efforts of others, and divisions across committees over what they wish the agency to do.
| Item Type: | Online resource (Website) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2013 The Author |
| Divisions: | LSE |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) J Political Science > JZ International relations |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Jul 2014 13:07 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 18:40 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/58353 |
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