Valentini, Laura (2012) Human rights, freedom, and political authority. Political Theory, 40 (5). pp. 573-601. ISSN 0090-5917
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
In this article, I sketch a Kant-inspired liberal account of human rights: the freedom-centred view. This account conceptualizes human rights as entitlements that any political authority—any state in the first instance—must secure to qualify as a guarantor of its subjects’ innate right to freedom. On this picture, when a state (or state-like institution) protects human rights, it reasonably qualifies as a moral agent to be treated with respect. By contrast, when a state (or state-like institution) fails to protect human rights, it loses its moral status and becomes liable to both internal and external interference. I argue that this account not only steers a middle course between so-called natural-law and political approaches to human rights but also satisfies three important theoretical desiderata—explanatory power, functional specificity, and critical capacity.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://ptx.sagepub.com/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2012 SAGE Publications |
| Divisions: | LSE |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Aug 2014 11:42 |
| Last Modified: | 25 Sep 2024 16:03 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/57245 |
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