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The good, the bad, and the talented: entrepreneurial talent and selfish behavior

Weitzel, Utz, Urbig, Diemo, Desai, Sameeksha, Sanders, Mark W. J. L. and Acs, Zoltan J. (2010) The good, the bad, and the talented: entrepreneurial talent and selfish behavior. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 76 (1). pp. 64-81. ISSN 0167-2681

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.02.013

Abstract

Talent allocation models assume that entrepreneurially talented people are selfish and thus allocate into unproductive or even destructive activities if these offer the highest private returns. This paper experimentally analyses selfish preferences of the entrepreneurially tal- ented. We find that making a distinction between creative talent and business talent explains systematic differences in selfish behavior. Generally, both the less business-talented and the more creative are more willing to forego private payoffs to avoid losses to others. A moderator analysis reveals that less creative individuals with business talent are significantly more selfish than all others, including the creative with business talent. This finding applies to both certain and risky payoffs with and without negative externalities. The paper makes a contribution to entrepreneurship research by qualifying the implications of talent allocation models and highlighting the importance of distinguishing between the two types of entrepreneurial talent. We also add to the field of experimental economics by advancing research on altruism under risk and with negative externalities.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-econom...
Additional Information: © 2010 Elsevier B.V.
Divisions: Management
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Sets: Departments > Management
Date Deposited: 10 Apr 2014 11:39
Last Modified: 20 Nov 2019 10:14
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/56470

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