Stefansson, Hlynur (2014) Humean supervenience and multidimensional semantics. Erkenntnis, 79 (6). pp. 1391-1406. ISSN 0165-0106
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
What distinguishes indicative conditionals from subjunctive conditionals, according to one popular view, is that the so-called Adams' thesis holds for the former kind of conditionals but the so-called Skyrms' thesis for the latter. According to a plausible metaphysical view, both conditionals and chances supervene on non-modal facts. But since chances do not supervene on facts about particular events but facts about event-types, the past as well as the future is chancy. Some philosophers have worried that this metaphysical view is incompatible with the aforementioned view on the probability of conditionals. This paper however shows that there is no need to worry, as these views can all be simultaneously satisfied within the so-called Multidimensional Possible World Semantics for conditionals.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://www.springer.com/philosophy/journal/10670 |
Additional Information: | © 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht |
Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Date Deposited: | 11 Mar 2014 14:08 |
Last Modified: | 12 Dec 2024 00:36 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/56042 |
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