Gavazza, Alessandro 
ORCID: 0000-0001-9236-5813 and Lizzeri, Alessandro
(2011)
Transparency and manipulation of public accounts.
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 13 (3).
327 - 349.
ISSN 1097-3923
Abstract
We study the policy choices of an incumbent politician when voters imperfectly observe aggregate spending and the incumbent’s ability. We show that total spending is decreasing in the transparency of spending, but increasing in the transparency of the incumbent’s ability. The model further provides a possible explanation of the choice of inefficient tools of redistribution, and investigates the incentives for politicians to manipulate public accounts. We show that politicians may choose inefficient and manipulable tools, but that this choice has positive welfare consequences because it leads to a reduction in spending.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679779 |
| Additional Information: | © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. |
| Divisions: | Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General) |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H50 - General |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Feb 2014 16:04 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Dec 2024 00:02 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/55724 |
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