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The dissent voting behaviour of central bankers: what do we really know?

Horvath, Roman, Rusnak, Marek, Smidkova, Katerina and Zapal, Jan (2014) The dissent voting behaviour of central bankers: what do we really know? Applied Economics, 46 (4). pp. 450-461. ISSN 0003-6846

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Identification Number: 10.1080/00036846.2013.851775


We examine the determinants of the dissent in central bank boards voting records about monetary policy rates in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, the UK and the US. In contrast to previous studies, we consider 25 different macroeconomic, financial, institutional, psychological or preference-related factors jointly and use Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to formally assess the attendant model uncertainty. We find that the rate of dissent is between 5% and 20% for the examined central banks. Our results suggest that most of the examined regressors, including factors that capture the effects of inflation and output, are not robust determinants of voting dissent. This result suggests that unobserved characteristics of central bankers and different communication strategies drive the dissent, rather than the level of macroeconomic uncertainty.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2013 Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
Divisions: Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Date Deposited: 20 Dec 2013 15:18
Last Modified: 20 Oct 2021 02:08
Projects: P402/12/1993
Funders: Czech Republic

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