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Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons

Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni (2006) Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons. Philosophical Quarterly, 56 (222). pp. 114-120. ISSN 0031-8094

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Identification Number: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00432.x


The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind only if its formulation does not involve any reference to the attitudes for which it provides a reason. We argue that despite its merits, Olson's solution is unsatisfactory. We go on to suggest that the buck-passing account might be acceptable even if the problem in question turns out to be insoluble.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2006 John Wiley & Sons
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
Date Deposited: 21 Nov 2013 14:12
Last Modified: 10 Jun 2024 06:39

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