Rabinowicz, Wlodek (2002) Does practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction? Erkenntnis, 57 (1). pp. 91-122. ISSN 0165-0106
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Abstract
It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on the offered odds. And even apart from this consideration, assigning probabilities to the options among which one is choosing is futile since such probabilities could be of no possible use in choice. The paper subjects these arguments to critical examination and suggests that, appearances notwithstanding, practical deliberation need not crowd outself-prediction.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://link.springer.com/journal/10670 |
Additional Information: | © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers |
Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics |
Date Deposited: | 20 Nov 2013 15:16 |
Last Modified: | 18 Nov 2024 20:03 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/54490 |
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Does deliberation crowd out self-prediction? (deposited 20 Nov 2013 14:10)
- Does practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction? (deposited 20 Nov 2013 15:16) [Currently Displayed]
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