Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring

Nava, Francesco and Piccione, Michele (2012) Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring. . London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. the main result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, efficiency can be sustained with sequential equilibria that are independent of the players' beliefs. Stronger results are obtained when only acyclic monitoring structures are allowed or players have unit discount rates. These equilibria satisfy numerous robustness properties.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL:	http://personal.lse.ac.uk/nava/Local%20Monitoring....
Additional Information:	© 2012 The Authors
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited:	11 Nov 2013 12:21
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 20:22
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/54250

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