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Prerogatives to depart from equality1

Otsuka, Michael (2006) Prerogatives to depart from equality1. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 58. pp. 95-112. ISSN 1358-2461

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Identification Number: 10.1017/S135824610605805X


Should egalitarian justice be qualified by an agent-relative prerogative to act on a preference for—and thereby in a manner that gives rise to or preserves a greater than equal share of the goods of life for—oneself, one's family, loved ones, or friends as compared with strangers? Although many would reply that the answer to this question must be ‘yes’, I shall argue here that the case for such a prerogative to depart from equality is much less far-reaching than one might think. I have in mind a prerogative to depart from a specific form of equality: namely, equality of opportunity for such advantages as resources or welfare. I mean to refer to the strong form of equal opportunity elaborated and defended by Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen whereby, roughly speaking, two people have equal opportunity for advantage if they face the same choices and will end up at the same level of advantage if they make the same choices.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2006 The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Date Deposited: 07 Nov 2013 13:59
Last Modified: 16 May 2024 23:10

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