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Skepticism about saving the greater number

Otsuka, Michael (2004) Skepticism about saving the greater number. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 32 (4). pp. 413-426. ISSN 0048-3915

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Identification Number: 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2004.00020.x


Suppose that each of the following four conditions obtains: 1. You can save either a greater or a lesser number of innocent people from (equally) serious harm. 2. You can do so at trivial cost to yourself. 3. If you act to save, then the harm you prevent is harm that would not have been prevented if you had done nothing. 4. All other things are equal. A skeptic about saving the greater number rejects the common-sensical claim that you have a duty to save the greater number in such circumstances.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Date Deposited: 04 Nov 2013 09:27
Last Modified: 16 May 2024 00:17

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