Levy, Gilat 
ORCID: 0009-0006-7641-1668 and Razin, Ronny ORCID: 0009-0009-5169-0180
(2004)
It takes two: an explanation of the democratic peace.
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 (1).
pp. 1-29.
ISSN 1542-4774
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Abstract
In this paper, we provide an explanation of the democratic peace hypothesis, i.e., the observation that democracies rarely fight one another. We show that in the presence of information asymmetries and strategic complements, the strategic interaction between two democracies differs from any other dyad. In our model, two democracies induce the highest probability of peaceful resolution of conflicts. But it takes two for peace; one democracy involved in a conflict does not necessarily increases the probability of a peaceful resolution compared to a conflict between two non-democratic regimes.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Official URL: | http://mitpress.mit.edu/jeea |
| Additional Information: | Published 2004 © MIT Press. LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk>) of the LSE Research Online website. |
| Divisions: | STICERD Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Dec 2005 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2024 03:32 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/539 |
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