Levy, Gilat and Razin, Ronny (2003) It takes two: an explanation of the democratic peace. 3947. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.Full text not available from this repository.
In this Paper, we provide an explanation of the democratic peace hypothesis, i.e., the observation that democracies rarely fight one another. We show that in the presence of information asymmetries and strategic complements, the strategic interaction between two democracies differs from any other dyad. In our model, two democracies induce the highest probability of peaceful resolution of conflicts. But it takes two for peace; one democracy involved in a conflict does not necessarily increase the probability of a peaceful resolution compared to a conflict between two non-democratic regimes.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2003 Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||cheap talk and democratic peace|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||J Political Science > JA Political science (General)|
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information|
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
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