Levy, Gilat 
ORCID: 0009-0006-7641-1668 and Razin, Ronny ORCID: 0009-0009-5169-0180
(2003)
It takes two: an explanation of the democratic peace.
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.
Abstract
In this Paper, we provide an explanation of the democratic peace hypothesis, i.e., the observation that democracies rarely fight one another. We show that in the presence of information asymmetries and strategic complements, the strategic interaction between two democracies differs from any other dyad. In our model, two democracies induce the highest probability of peaceful resolution of conflicts. But it takes two for peace; one democracy involved in a conflict does not necessarily increase the probability of a peaceful resolution compared to a conflict between two non-democratic regimes.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.cepr.org |
| Additional Information: | © 2003 Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin |
| Divisions: | Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Jun 2008 08:41 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2024 04:03 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5379 |
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