Strategic financial innovation in segmented markets

Rahi, Rohit ORCID: 0000-0001-6887-9160 and Zigrand, Jean-Pierre ORCID: 0000-0002-7784-4231 (2004) Strategic financial innovation in segmented markets. . Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.

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Abstract

We analyse an equilibrium model with restricted investor participation in which strategic arbitrageurs play an innovation game and exploit the resulting mispricings by reaping trading profits. Since the equilibrium asset structure is not chosen by a social planner, it is chosen to maximize arbitrage profits and depends therefore realistically upon considerations such as depth, liquidity and gains from trade. In addition, the welfare properties of the resulting asset structure are studied. It is shown that the degree of inefficiency depends upon the heterogeneity of investors. The conjecture of the optimality of ‘Macro Markets’ is analysed formally in this framework.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://www.cepr.org
Additional Information:	© 2004 Rohit Rahi and Jean-Pierre Zigrand
Divisions:	Financial Markets Group Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G18 - Government Policy and Regulation G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G20 - General
Date Deposited:	05 Jun 2008 07:56
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 18:39
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5374

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