Konstantinidis, Nikitas (2013) Optimal committee design and political participation. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 25 (4). pp. 443-466. ISSN 0951-6298
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Building on a Condorcetian common-values framework, this paper tackles the question of optimal committee formation within a community of finite size. Solving for the Bayesian information aggregation game yields some interesting normative results that emphasize the presence of informational externalities as root causes of suboptimally low voluntary participation levels in communal decision-making and the potentially Pareto-enhancing nature of drafting vis-à-vis decentralized mechanisms of self-selection. I firstly derive the optimal size of a committee based on the assumption of informative voting and, then, I show that it is globally optimal amongst all voting equilibrium strategies. I subsequently compare it to the various symmetric equilibria that may arise in a complete information setting or a Bayesian environment with heterogeneous private costs. I finally sketch out an optimal transfer scheme that can ex ante implement the socially efficient committee size
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://jtp.sagepub.com/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2013 The Author |
| Divisions: | Government |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JC Political theory |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Oct 2013 15:35 |
| Last Modified: | 14 Sep 2024 06:02 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/53585 |
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