Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Intelligent people defect more in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game

Kanazawa, Satoshi and Fontaine, Linus (2013) Intelligent people defect more in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 6 (3). pp. 201-213. ISSN 1937-321X

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Why so many people make the theoretically irrational decision to cooperate in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game remains a puzzle in game theory. Recent developments in evolutionary psychology suggest that the anomaly may be attributable to evolutionary constraints on the human brain and their interaction with general intelligence. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test three hypotheses: (a) projection of a video image of another experimental subject increases cooperation because the human brain implicitly assumes that their choice is not anonymous; (b) more intelligent individuals are more likely to defect, because they are more likely to comprehend the evolutionarily novel features of the experiment that make defection rational; and (c) the effect of the video projection on cooperation is greater among less intelligent individuals. The experiment clearly supports two of the three hypotheses.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/npe/index.aspx
Additional Information: © 2013 American Psychological Association
Library of Congress subject classification: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Sets: Departments > Management
Research centres and groups > Managerial Economics and Strategy Group
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 23 Sep 2013 10:29
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/52868/

Actions (login required)

Record administration - authorised staff only Record administration - authorised staff only