Caselli, Francesco 
ORCID: 0009-0001-5191-7156 and Morelli, Massimo
(2000)
Bad politicians.
.
Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.
Abstract
We present a simple theory of the quality of elected officials. Quality has (at least) two dimensions: competence and honesty. Voters prefer competent and honest policy-makers, so high-quality citizens have a greater chance of being elected to office. But low-quality citizens have a ‘comparative advantage’ in pursuing elective office, because their market wages are lower than the market wages of high-quality citizens (competence), and/or because they reap higher returns from holding office (honesty). In the political equilibrium, the average quality of the elected body depends on the structure of rewards from holding public office. Under the assumption that the rewards from office are increasing in the average quality of office holders there can be multiple equilibria in quality. Under the assumption that incumbent policy-makers set the rewards for future policy-makers there can be path dependence in quality.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.cepr.org |
| Additional Information: | © 2000 Francesco Caselli and Massimo Morelli |
| Divisions: | Centre for Economic Performance Economics |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Jun 2008 11:37 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2024 03:16 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5277 |
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