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Lo "spettro" delle frequenze radio

Valletti, Tommaso and Prat, Andrea (2000) Lo "spettro" delle frequenze radio. Mercato Concorrenza Regole (3). pp. 565-582. ISSN 1590-5128

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Abstract

Economic theory, as well as various countries' experiences, show that auctioning the spectrum works better than other allocation methods, such as beauty contests. As well as raising revenues, a well-designed auction assigns licences to the operators best able to use them. Auctions can also be designed to advance public-policy goals. In this paper, we discuss some common misunderstandings about auctions. We also consider the need for asymmetric regulations for the next generation of mobile services in terms of bandwidth, roaming and coverage constraints.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.mulino.it/edizioni/riviste/scheda_rivis...
Additional Information: © 2000 Societa Editrice Il Mulino
Divisions: Economics
STICERD
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Date Deposited: 02 Jun 2008 15:39
Last Modified: 27 May 2020 23:02
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5255

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