Valletti, Tommaso and Prat, Andrea (2000) Lo "spettro" delle frequenze radio. Mercato Concorrenza Regole (3). pp. 565-582. ISSN 1590-5128
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Economic theory, as well as various countries' experiences, show that auctioning the spectrum works better than other allocation methods, such as beauty contests. As well as raising revenues, a well-designed auction assigns licences to the operators best able to use them. Auctions can also be designed to advance public-policy goals. In this paper, we discuss some common misunderstandings about auctions. We also consider the need for asymmetric regulations for the next generation of mobile services in terms of bandwidth, roaming and coverage constraints.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.mulino.it/edizioni/riviste/scheda_rivis... |
| Additional Information: | © 2000 Societa Editrice Il Mulino |
| Divisions: | Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Date Deposited: | 02 Jun 2008 15:39 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 21:19 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5255 |
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