Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

The collective fallacy: the possibility of irreducibly collective action without corresponding collective moral responsibility

Hedahl, Marcus (2013) The collective fallacy: the possibility of irreducibly collective action without corresponding collective moral responsibility. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 43 (3). pp. 283-300. ISSN 0048-3931

Full text not available from this repository.
Identification Number: 10.1177/0048393113489266

Abstract

The common assumption is that if a group comprising moral agents can act intentionally, as a group, then the group itself can also be properly regarded as a moral agent with respect to that action. I argue, however, that this common assumption is the result of a problematic line of reasoning I refer to as "the collective fallacy." Recognizing the collective fallacy as a fallacy allows us to see that if there are, in fact, irreducibly joint actors, then some of them will lack the full-fledged moral agency of their members. The descriptivist question of whether a group can perform irreducibly joint intentional action need not rise and fall with the normative question of whether a group can be a moral agent.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://pos.sagepub.com/
Additional Information: © 2013 The Author
Divisions: Grantham Research Institute
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Sets: Research centres and groups > Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
Date Deposited: 12 Sep 2013 13:39
Last Modified: 20 Mar 2019 02:13
Funders: Woodrow Wilson Foundation
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/52528

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item