Goriaev, Alexei P., Palomino, Frédéric and Prat, Andrea (2001) Mutual fund tournament: risk taking incentives induced by ranking objectives. 2794. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.Full text not available from this repository.
There is now extensive empirical evidence showing that fund managers have relative performance objectives and adapt their investment strategy in the last part of the calendar year to balance their performance in the early part of the year. Emphasis was, however, put on returns in excess of some exogenous benchmark return. In this Paper, we investigate whether fund managers have ranking objectives (as in a tournament). First, in a two-period model, we analyse the game played by two risk-neutral fund managers with ranking objectives. We show that ranking objectives provide incentives for an interim loser to increase risk in the last part of the year. In the second part of the Paper, we test some predictions of the model. We find evidence that funds ranked in the top decile after the first part of the year have risk incentives generated by ranking objectives and that risk induced by ranking objectives is mainly systematic.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2001 Alexei Goriaev, Frederic Palomino and Andrea Prat|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||interim performance, ranking-based objectives, risk-taking incentives|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HG Finance|
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G11 - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Rating Agencies
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
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