Howson, Colin (2013) Hume’s theorem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44 (3). pp. 339-346. ISSN 00393681
A common criticism of Hume’s famous anti-induction argument is that it is vitiated because it fails to foreclose the possibility of an authentically probabilistic justification of induction. I argue that this claim is false, and that on the contrary, the probability calculus itself, in the form of an elementary consequence that I call Hume’s Theorem, fully endorses Hume’s argument. Various objections, including the often-made claim that Hume is defeated by de Finetti’s exchangeability results, are considered and rejected.
|Additional Information:||© 2013 Elsevier B.V.|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Sets:||Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method|
|Date Deposited:||17 Jul 2013 14:49|
Actions (login required)
|Record administration - authorised staff only|