Howson, Colin (2013) Hume’s theorem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44 (3). pp. 339-346. ISSN 0039-3681
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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.03.002
Abstract
A common criticism of Hume’s famous anti-induction argument is that it is vitiated because it fails to foreclose the possibility of an authentically probabilistic justification of induction. I argue that this claim is false, and that on the contrary, the probability calculus itself, in the form of an elementary consequence that I call Hume’s Theorem, fully endorses Hume’s argument. Various objections, including the often-made claim that Hume is defeated by de Finetti’s exchangeability results, are considered and rejected.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.journals.elsevier.com/studies-in-histor... |
| Additional Information: | © 2013 Elsevier B.V. |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Jul 2013 14:49 |
| Last Modified: | 14 Sep 2024 05:54 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/51044 |
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