Patent renewals and r&d incentives

Cornelli, Francesca and Schankerman, Mark ORCID: 0009-0006-1071-7672 (1998) Patent renewals and r&d incentives. . Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.

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Abstract

In a model with moral hazard and assymmetric information, we show that it can be welfare-improving to differentiate patent lives when firms have different R&D productivities. A uniform patent life provides excessive R&D incentive to low-productivity firms, and too little to high ones. The optimally differentiated patent scheme can be implemented through a menu of patent lives (or renewals) and associated fees. We characterize the optimal mechanism, and use simulation analysis to compare it with existing patent renewal systems and to illustrate the potential welfare gains from the optimal policy.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://www.cepr.org
Additional Information:	© 1998 Francesca Cornelli and Mark Schankerman
Divisions:	Economics STICERD
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
JEL classification:	O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Technological Change; Research and Development > O34 - Intellectual Property Rights: National and International Issues O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Technological Change; Research and Development > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation
Date Deposited:	27 May 2008 14:28
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 18:25
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5090

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