Mahtani, Anna 
ORCID: 0000-0003-1581-4325
(2012)
Diachronic Dutch book arguments.
Philosophical Review, 121 (3).
pp. 443-450.
ISSN 0031-8108
Abstract
Reflection Principle can be defended with a Diachronic Dutch Book Argument (DBA), but it is also defeated by numerous compelling counter-examples. It seems then that Diachronic DBAs can lead us astray. Should we reject them en masse—including Lewis’s Diachronic DBA for Conditionalization? Rachael Briggs’s “suppositional test” is supposed to differentiate between Diachronic DBAs that we can safely ignore (including the DBA for Reflection) and Diachronic DBAs that we should find compelling (including the DBA for Conditionalization). I argue that Brigg’s suppositional test is wrong: it sets the bar for coherence too high and places certain cases of self-doubt on the wrong side of the divide. Given that the suppositional test is unsatisfactory, we are left without any justification for discriminating between Diachronic DBAs and ought to reject them all—including the DBA for Conditionalization.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://philreview.dukejournals.org/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2012 Cornell University |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 02 Oct 2013 10:47 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Oct 2024 07:51 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/50719 |
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