Valentini, Laura (2013) Justice, disagreement and democracy. British Journal of Political Science, 43 (1). pp. 177-199. ISSN 0007-1234
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Is democracy a requirement of justice or an instrument for realizing it? This article argues that the correct answer to this question depends on the background circumstances against which democracy is defended. In the presence of thin reasonable disagreement about justice, we should value democracy only instrumentally (if at all); in the presence of thick reasonable disagreement about justice, we should value it also intrinsically, as a necessary demand of justice. Since the latter type of disagreement is pervasive in real-world politics, the conclusion is that theories of justice designed for our world should be centrally concerned with democracy.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123412000294 |
| Additional Information: | © 2013 CUP |
| Divisions: | Government |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 27 Sep 2013 10:47 |
| Last Modified: | 23 Apr 2024 23:24 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/50455 |
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