Hellman, Ziv and Peretz, Ron (2013) Graph value for cooperative games. . Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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Abstract
We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected paths within the graph. This leads to a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied here from an axiomatic perspective. The resulting ‘graph value’ is endogenously asymmetric, with the automorphism group of the graph playing a crucial role in determining the relative values of players.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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| Official URL: | http://www2.lse.ac.uk/maths/home.aspx |
| Additional Information: | © 2013 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Mathematics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D46 - Value Theory D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior |
| Date Deposited: | 07 May 2013 14:07 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 20:23 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/50073 |
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