Caselli, Francesco 
ORCID: 0009-0001-5191-7156
(2006)
Power struggles and the natural resource curse.
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Francesco Caselli.
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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that the natural-resource curse operates through the behavior of the political elite, yet there are few models that convincingly illustrate the mechanism at work. I present a model where natural-resource abundance generates power struggles, thereby increasing the effective discount rate of the governing group. As a result, the elite makes fewer investments in the long-run development of the country.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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| Official URL: | http://cep.lse.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 2006 the author |
| Divisions: | Centre for Economic Performance Economics |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 20 May 2008 13:34 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2024 03:17 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4926 |
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