Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Second-hand markets and collusion by manufacturers of semidurable goods

Schiraldi, Pasquale (2006) Second-hand markets and collusion by manufacturers of semidurable goods. WP2006-028. Department of Economics, Boston University, Boston, MA., USA.

Full text not available from this repository.
Identification Number: WP2006-028


I show that when oligopolistic firms manufacture semidurable goods, second-hand markets can play a key role in supporting collusive behavior. This in spite of the fact that a monopolist manufacturer has an incentive to eliminate second-hand markets – a point made by a number of authors. The idea that second-hand markets facilitate collusion is supported by the many examples in which manufacturers strengthen secondhands markets, e.g. by providing warranty coverage across owners, or by encouraging dealers to accept trade-ins. The intuition is that the prospect of obtaining a high price in a second-hand market increases the demand for new goods. This means that the expectation of a price war unleashed by the violation of a collusive agreement will decrease not only the future prices of the new and used goods but also the current price of the new good, thus making the defection itself less profitable. In this framework, I analyze the role of leasing policies, buyback policies and warranty coverage for used units.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2006 the authors
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Date Deposited: 20 May 2008 10:45
Last Modified: 01 Oct 2010 08:54

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item