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Reciprocal causation and the proximate–ultimate distinction

Dickins, T. E. and Barton, R. A. (2013) Reciprocal causation and the proximate–ultimate distinction. Biology and Philosophy, 28 (5). pp. 747-756. ISSN 0169-3867

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s10539-012-9345-z

Abstract

Laland and colleagues have sought to challenge the proximate-ultimate distinction claiming that it imposes a unidirectional model of causation, is limited in its capacity to account for complex biological phenomena, and hinders progress in biology. In this article the core of their argument is critically analyzed. It is claimed that contrary to their claims Laland et al. rely upon the proximate-ultimate distinction to make their points and that their alternative conception of reciprocal causation refers to phenomena that were already accounted for by standard theory.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://link.springer.com/journal/10539
Additional Information: © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Divisions: CPNSS
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Sets: Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Date Deposited: 18 Dec 2012 15:24
Last Modified: 20 Sep 2019 01:40
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/47731

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