Flikschuh, Katrin (2011) On the cogency of human rights. Jurisprudence, 2 (1). pp. 17-36. ISSN 2040-3313
This article queries the cogency of human rights reasoning in the context of global justice debates, focusing on Charles Beitz's practice-based approach. By 'cogency' is meant the adequacy of human rights theorising to its intended context of application. Negatively, the author argues that Beitz's characterisation of human rights reasoning as a 'global discursive practice' lacks cogency when considered in the context of the post-colonial state system; she focuses on African decolonisation. Positively, she suggests that Beitz's gloss on international human rights as an 'appurtenance' to the traditional state system offers a more promising starting point for global normative theorising, drawing attention to the requirement of sovereign competence as a necessary condition of possible human rights fulfilment. However, a concern with strengthening the sovereign competence of weak states should lead us to consider neglected public goods theorising in favour of an over-emphasis on individual human rights.
|Additional Information:||© 2011 Hart Publishing|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||J Political Science > JC Political theory|
|Sets:||Departments > Government|
|Date Deposited:||12 Nov 2012 09:53|
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