Larcinese, Valentino (2005) Electoral competition and redistribution with rationally informed voters. The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, 4 (1). ISSN 1935-1682
Abstract
In spite of the negligible probability that everyone has to cast a decisive vote, political information can be relevant for a number of private decisions. Under quite mild assumptions, the demand for information is increasing in income. Being informed affects responsiveness to electoral platforms and vote-seeking political parties should take this into account in their optimization process. As a consequence, redistribution is generally lower than what the median voter theorem predicts. Moreover, in contrast with what most literature takes for granted, an increase in inequality does not unambiguously increase redistribution. This is consistent with most empirical research in this field. Finally, an increase in the cost of information induces a reduction in redistribution.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.bepress.com/bejeap |
| Additional Information: | © 2005 the author |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | redistribution, welfare spending, median voter, information, inequality |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology |
| Sets: | Departments > Government Collections > Economists Online Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) |
| Rights: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/4726/ |
Actions (login required)
 |
Record administration - authorised staff only |
