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Private enforcement and social efficiency

Anderson, James E. and Bandiera, Oriana (2005) Private enforcement and social efficiency. Journal of Development Economics, 77 (2). pp. 341-366. ISSN 0304-3878

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.05.003


This paper makes precise the distributional consequences and social efficiency of private enforcement of property rights. Properties of different values are subject to predation and owners choose between self-defense and private enforcement services. A distributional conflict of interest arises as private protection purchased by rich owners deflects predators on low value properties. The market structure of enforcement and development affect the distribution of property income through relative changes in the security of high and low values property. Moreover, because of the externality enforcers impose on poorer owners, the availability of private enforcement may constrain the policy of a benevolent State.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2005 Elsevier
Divisions: Economics
Subjects: K Law > K Law (General)
JEL classification: O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements: Legal, Social, Economic, and Political
K - Law and Economics > K1 - Basic Areas of Law > K11 - Property Law
Date Deposited: 08 May 2008 09:29
Last Modified: 20 Sep 2021 03:36

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