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Private enforcement and social efficiency

Anderson, James E. and Bandiera, Oriana (2005) Private enforcement and social efficiency. Journal of Development Economics, 77 (2). pp. 341-366. ISSN 0304-3878

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Abstract

This paper makes precise the distributional consequences and social efficiency of private enforcement of property rights. Properties of different values are subject to predation and owners choose between self-defense and private enforcement services. A distributional conflict of interest arises as private protection purchased by rich owners deflects predators on low value properties. The market structure of enforcement and development affect the distribution of property income through relative changes in the security of high and low values property. Moreover, because of the externality enforcers impose on poorer owners, the availability of private enforcement may constrain the policy of a benevolent State.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03043...
Additional Information: © 2005 Elsevier
Library of Congress subject classification: K Law > K Law (General)
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements: Legal, Social, Economic, and Political
K - Law and Economics > K1 - Basic Areas of Law > K11 - Property Law
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 08 May 2008 09:29
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/4723/

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