Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian 
ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X
(2013)
Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology.
Synthese, 190 (5).
pp. 787-808.
ISSN 0039-7857
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Abstract
Bayesian epistemology tells us with great precision how we should move from prior to posterior beliefs in light of new evidence or information, but says little about where our prior beliefs come from. It o¤ers few resources to describe some prior beliefs as rational or well-justified, and others as irrational or unreasonable. A di¤erent strand of epistemology takes the central epistemological question to be not how to change one's beliefs in light of new evidence, but what reasons justify a given set of beliefs in the first place. We o¤er an account of rational belief formation that closes some of the gap between Bayesianism and its reason-based alternative, formalizing the idea that an agent can have reasons for his or her (prior) beliefs, in addition to evidence or information in the ordinary Bayesian sense. Our analysis of reasons for belief is part of a larger programme of research on the role of reasons in rational agency.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.springer.com/philosophy/epistemology+an... |
| Additional Information: | © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht |
| Divisions: | Government Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) Q Science > Q Science (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Oct 2012 09:37 |
| Last Modified: | 14 Sep 2024 05:41 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/46868 |
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