Levy, Gilat and Razin, Ronny (2014) Calvin's reformation in Geneva: self and social signalling. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 16 (5). pp. 730-742. ISSN 1097-3923
- Accepted Version
Restricted to Repository staff only until 15 August 2016.
As Weber (1904) recognized, Calvinistic beliefs about predestination may constitute a powerful incentive for good works; an individual wishes to receive assurances about her future prospects of salvation, and good works may provide a positive signal about such prospects. These beliefs can in turn create a social pressure to behave well, as good works can also signal to others that individuals belong to the “elect” and are therefore likely to behave well in social interactions. Moreover, the Consistory, an institution created by Calvin to monitor and publicize individuals’ behaviour, can allow for such social signalling. We analyze these self and social signalling incentives, and show how religions affect levels of cooperation and coordination.
|Additional Information:||© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BL Religion
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology > Z12 - Religion|
|Sets:||Departments > Economics
Collections > Economists Online
|Project and Funder Information:||
|Date Deposited:||14 Oct 2013 13:14|
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