Chassang, Sylvain, Padró i Miquel, Gerard and Snowberg, Erik (2012) Selective trials: a principal-agent approach to randomized control experiments. American Economic Review, 102 (4). pp. 1279-1309. ISSN 0002-8282
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We study the design of randomized controlled experiments when outcomes are significantly affected by experimental subjects' unobserved effort expenditure. While standard randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are internally consistent, the unobservability of effort compromises external validity. We approach trial design as a principal-agent problem and show that natural extensions of RCTs—which we call selective trials—can help improve external validity. In particular, selective trials can disentangle the effects of treatment, effort, and the interaction of treatment and effort. Moreover, they can help identify when treatment effects are affected by erroneous beliefs and inappropriate effort expenditure
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php |
| Additional Information: | © 2012 American Economic Association |
| Divisions: | Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C90 - General C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C93 - Field Experiments D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O2 - Development Planning and Policy > O22 - Project Analysis |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Oct 2012 15:59 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Apr 2024 19:00 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/46838 |
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