Kuhn, Kai Uwe and Van Reenen, John 
ORCID: 0000-0001-9153-2907
(2008)
Interoperability and market foreclosure in the European Microsoft case.
Centre for Economic Performance special papers (CEPSP20).
London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.
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Abstract
In this paper we discuss some of the most important economic issues raised in European Commission vs. Microsoft (2004) concerning the market for work group servers. In our view, the most important economic issues relate to (a) foreclosure incentives and (b) innovation effects of the proposed remedy. We discuss the economic basis for the Commission’s claims that Microsoft had incentives to exclude rivals in the work group server market through degrading the interoperability of their server operating systems with Windows. We also examine the impact of compulsory disclosure of information on interoperability and argue that the effects on innovation are not unambiguously negative as Microsoft claim. We conclude with some general implications of the case for anti-trust enforcement in high innovation sectors.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Report) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://cep.lse.ac.uk |
| Additional Information: | © 2008 the authors |
| Divisions: | Centre for Economic Performance Economics |
| Subjects: | T Technology > T Technology (General) H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
| JEL classification: | L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Technological Change; Research and Development L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance |
| Date Deposited: | 06 May 2008 16:20 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Nov 2024 05:04 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4664 |
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